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This paper explores the idea that how wealth is distributed across social groups (ethnic or 
language groups, gender, etc.) fundamentally affects the evolution of economic inequality. 
By providing microfoundations suitable for this exploration, this paper hopes to enhance our 
understanding of when social forces contribute to the reproduction of economic inequality. In 
tackling this issue, this paper offers contributions in two domains. First, it models social 
capital as a real capital asset with direct use and collateral value.  Second, it extends the 
concepts of identity, alienation and polarization used by Esteban and Ray (1994). This 
generalization permits us to consider the multiple characteristics that shape social identity, 
inclusion and exclusion. It also underwrites a higher-order measure of socio-economic 
polarization that permits us to explore the hypothesis that economic inequality is most 
pernicious and persistent when it is socially embedded. Among other things we are able to 
show that holding constant the initial levels of economic polarization and wealth inequality, 
higher socio-economic polarization increases subsequent income and wealth inequality.  Far 
from being a distributionally neutral panacea for missing markets, social capital in this model 
may itself generate exclusion and deepen social and economic cleavages.
ii Social Capital and the Reproduction of Economic Inequality in Polarized Societies 
A number of factors have renewed interest in economic inequality, including demonstrations 
that inequality may slow the rate of growth, and that a number of economic forces may tend 
to reinforce inherited inequality.
 1 While much of this work is exclusively economic in 
orientation, several authors have argued that economic inequality is most durable, 
problematic and pernicious when it is socially embedded, meaning that the wealthy and the 
poor are distinguished not only by their money, but also by their culture, language or 
physical appearance. In the case of Latin America, Adolfo Figueroa (1996 and 2003) argues 
that inequality is most severe and inhibits economic growth in the Andean and Central 
American regions where inequality is socially embedded. On a more global scale, Frances 
Stewart (2001) has argued that it is socially embedded inequality, or what she calls horizontal 
inequality, that is most economically and socially problematic. 
The goal of this paper is to explore the idea that non-economic characteristics of 
society fundamentally affect the evolution of inequality. By providing microfoundations 
suitable for this exploration, this paper hopes to enhance our understanding of when social 
forces contribute to economic inequality.  In tackling this issue, this paper offers 
contributions in two domains. First, it adds a dimension to the literature on social capital by 
showing how social relationships—directly valued for their own enjoyment—can serve as 
collateralizable social capital assets. Second, it offers a modest generalization of the concepts 
of identity, alienation and economic polarization used by Esteban and Ray (1994). This 
generalization permits us to consider the multiple characteristics that shape social identity, 
inclusion and exclusion. It also underwrites a higher-order measure of socio-economic 
                                                 
1 The detrimental impact of economic inequality on growth (Alesina and Rodrik 1994, Deininger and Squire 
1998, Persson and Tabellini 1994, Aghion et al. 1999, Birdsall and Londono 1997, to name just a few) has been 
well documented. 
1 polarization that permits us to explore the ideas of Figueroa and Stewart. Among other things 
we are able to show that holding constant the initial level of economic polarization and 
inequality (the latter as defined by Esteban and Ray), increases in socio-economic 
polarization increase economic inequality. 
The core of this paper is a model in which individuals not only directly value social 
ties as a consumption good, but can leverage economic benefits through these relationships. 
These benefits can come for example in the form of informal credit; business advice, 
employment or other economically valuable information. The key mechanism available to 
encourage reciprocation to the group by those who receive such benefits (e.g., loan 
repayment, or mutual sharing of business tips) is social exclusion: a defector faces the 
penalty of having his or her social relationship with the group severed.  
Underpinning this model is a concept of social capital as a feature of social structure 
that relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint in economic transactions. It is the inherent 
value that individuals attach to social relationships that enables such relationships to function 
as social collateral for the benefit provided. In the notion of social capital that we advance in 
this essay, then, we relate the intrinsic value of social capital to its instrumental value, with 
the existence of the former making possible the realization of the latter.  
While this formulation of the concept is not so broad as to capture everything that 
travels under the social capital rubric, it permits us to explore the notion that resources 
committed to building up social capital are not equally productive for all individuals. Returns 
to social investment are strongly impacted by people’s identity characteristics. In particular, 
each individual has an identity, which is a function of economic characteristics (wealth) and 
socially relevant immutable characteristics such as race, gender, or family background. In 
2 deciding how much to invest in a given social group, each person’s identity comes into play, 
determining the size of the social capital stock he or she can build up given a certain amount 
of social investment, and therefore by affecting the size of social collateral that this 
investment could represent. 
Moving from this agent-level to an aggregate perspective, the paper provides an 
analysis of the creation of inequality in highly polarized economies in which social 
interactions underpin economic activity. The role of population distribution in identity space 
is examined, in order to investigate what types of initial distributions may make inequality in 
access to material benefits from the group, and consequently in economic welfare, more 
persistent. Special consideration is given to distributions depicting various degrees of 
‘polarization’. For this, we formalize the concept of socio-economic polarization as a specific 
feature of distribution, one that is distinct from the concepts of economic polarization and 
inequality.  Numerical simulation of the model of social capital as social collateral shows that 
greater initial socio-economic polarization will lead to greater income and wealth inequality.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 offers a brief review of 
the literature on social capital and its commonly recognized shortcoming. Section 2 builds on 
that literature, and tries to rectify some of its shortcomings with a model of the accumulation 
of social capital as social collateral in the presence of social identity and alienation. Section 3 
defines a measure of (two-dimensional) socio-economic polarization and defines benchmark 
distributions for the numerical analysis of the social capital model.  Section 4 then undertakes 
the numerical analysis, linking economic outcomes to the degree of initial socio-economic 
polarization and showing how social forces can deepen economic inequality in polarized 
3 societies.  Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper with thoughts on its policy implications and 
how the analysis might be deepened and carried forward. 
 
1. Rethinking social capital 
Scholars who have sought to incorporate social structure in economic analysis of human 
behavior have mostly done so acknowledging that the concept of ‘social capital’ has not yet 
intellectually matured. One of the most widely cited definitions refers to social capital as 
“features of social organization, such as networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate co-
ordination and co-operation for mutual benefit” (Putnam 1993). Other definitions of the term 
vary in generality and focus. For example, while some of the literature focuses on the 
community as the unit of analysis (Woolcock and Narayan 2000, Putnam 1993, Bowles 
1999), inherent in most definitions is the view of individuals as the “owners” and benefactors 
of social capital (Coleman 1988, Portes 1998).  
Leaving aside the issue of who owns social capital, other critics have argued that 
social capital is a poor term for the idea it is supposed to represent (Bowles 1999a).  Solow 
(2000) suggests that social capital as conventionally conceived does not have any of the key 
attributes of capital: It is not a stock of produced or natural factors of production that can be 
expected to yield productive services for some time; It is not a cumulation of past flows of 
investment, with past flows of depreciation netted out; etc.
2 Indeed, these concerns are 
understandable given the conceptual weaknesses in the literature on social capital.  
 
                                                 
2 For example, while the best of the empirical literature on social capital concerns itself with the potential 
econometric endogeneity of social capital (e.g. in Narayan and Pritchett 1999, Maluccio et al. 2000, Grootaert 
1999), it does not operate with an explicit view of where social capital comes from and what investments 
constitute it (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000 are an important exception to this statement). 
 
4 Yet a third conceptual weakness in research on social capital is reflected in the oft 
reoccurring expression of ambiguity whether social capital is necessarily always “good”, and 
where it is a “bad”, whether we can still call social capital a ‘capital’. Concern with the 
problematic nature of conceptualizations that already carry within them the alleged good 
outcomes of social capital have encouraged redefinitions that seek to circumvent tautologies 
(Durlauf 1999, Portes 1998).  
While this paper does not pretend to unify the full complexity of what is meant by 
social capital into a conceptually satisfying whole, it does offer an understanding of how one 
type of social capital functions as an individually owned asset stock, how accumulating this 
asset requires investment which comes at a cost, and how economic returns from social 
capital arise because it is a form of collateral that mitigates incentive-compatibility problems.  
As modeled here, social capital is neither inherently “good” nor “bad”. Rather, its social 
value or usefulness depends on the types of implicit contracts that become implementable 
because of the collateral value of social capital. As later analysis will show, social capital has 
the potential to be an equalizing, or an exclusionary, unequalizing force, depending on the 
way the social constellation of an economy frames its collateral value for each type of person 
in the economy, as later sections of this paper will explore. 
 
2.      A model of social capital and identity 
This section puts forward a model of social capital as social collateral in which social capital 
is individually “owned” and is a true capital stock in the conventional meaning of the term.  
Critically, the collateral value of social capital as modeled here will be shown to depend on 
the owner’s social identity.  Social capital is neither intrinsically good nor bad, and while it 
5 can potentially resolve problems of missing markets, it may in fact operate to deepen 
economic inequality and what we will call social polarization.
3   
We consider here a two-period model of individual investment in social relationships.  
In the first period individuals allocate their time between wage work and social relationships. 
Belonging to a social group not only generates intrinsic value, but they can expect to secure 
economic benefits conferred by the group on its members. The size of these benefits depends 
on the strength of social relationships the individuals develop within the group. In the second 
period, economic benefits obtained from the group are realized, individuals decide whether 
or not to reciprocate by providing in turn benefits to other group members, stocks of social 
capital are updated, and individuals enjoy both their consumption of material goods 
(purchased with wage and group benefits) and their stock of social relationships. 
Each individual enjoys four endowments: Inherited wealth; an immutable social 
characteristic such as gender, language or ethnicity; time; and an initial stock of social 
relationships, or inherited social capital. Given these endowments, individuals must choose 
how to allocate their time between work and social activity, with which social group to invest 
their social time, and later whether to reciprocate by committing some of their time in a way 
that would generate benefits for other group members. The next subsection below describes 
the accumulation of social capital, followed by a discussion of identity and its significance. 
We will then establish the logic of social capital as social collateral. 
 
                                                 
3 Durlauf and Fafchamps (forthcoming) make many of these same points in their comprehensive review of the 
concept and analysis of social capital. 
6 The Intrinsic Value of Social Capital 
In this two-period model, an individual gets utility both from consumption of material goods 
as well as from social interaction (friendship) with members of their social network:  
U = u(c1, S1) + β u(c2, S2) (1) 
where ct is consumption at time t and St is the stock of friendship (or, social capital) which 
the individual can enjoy. In period 1, total time L has to be allocated between labor Lw1, 
which earns wages w per time unit, and time spent participating in social relationships, Ls1.  
Time dedicated to social relationships comes at a cost of forgone labor income. In the second 
period, time is simply spent working and social relationships are enjoyed without any further 
costly investment.  At the beginning of period 1, the stock of pre-existing, or inherited, social 
capital S1 is given. Second period social capital is a mix of inherited and achieved social 
capital.  Specifically we assume that the time committed to social relationships and 
friendships in the first period, Ls1, affects the rate, δ
~
,  at which social capital increases: 
1 2 S ) δ (1 S
~
+ = ,   (2) 
where  s1 L T) 1 (
~
− + − = δ δ ,δ ∈ (0,1) is the ‘raw’ depreciation rate of social capital, and the 
expression T∈ [0,1] is what we will term the degree of effective alienation between the 
individual and the social group in whom the individual invests time.
4 
Expression (2) captures the idea that time spent with friends results in a mass of 
shared experience which enriches the direct utility value of future social interactions.  
Importantly, the stock of experience which constitutes social capital is specific to the 
individuals or social group in which time has been invested. 
                                                 
4 With δ we want to capture the notion that if someone does not commit any time at all to maintaining their 
inherited social relations, one can expect that the stock of these relationships will decline somewhat relative to 
its initial level.  
7 While the next sub-section will precisely define the degree of effective alienation, T, 
the intuition underlying alienation and the accumulation of social capital is straightforward.  
As shown in expression (2), a given investment of time, Ls1, with a particular social circle 
will result in a more highly valued stock of social experience the more the investor’s social 
identity lines up with that of the social circle (i.e., the less alienated is the individual from 
social group).  A high degree of alienation implies greater ‘discomfort’ of the individual with 
the group, and of the group with the individual. This greater discomfort is expressed here by 
saying that the individual achieves a lesser stock of social capital from time invested in a 
group from which she is alienated.
5  In the extreme, irrespective of time allocated to social 
activities, an individual will build up no social capital with a group if she is perfectly 
alienated from it (i.e. if T =1). In this event, the stock of social capital will decline over time 
from its initial level, to S2 = (1-δ) S1. The same holds if no time at all has been allocated to 
fostering social relations, i.e. if Ls1 = 0, regardless of the degree of alienation.  
 
Identity and Alienation 
This section puts forward a concept of alienation rooted in how strong and how disparate the 
identities of the individual and the group are.  We will first elaborate on the two elements 
constituting identity in the model, and then develop the mechanism through which identity 
becomes economically important. 
The idea that one’s economic position is an integral part of one’s identity has been 
suggested by authors from varied disciplines (e.g. Esteban and Ray 1994, Deutsch 1971, 
                                                 
5 Most of us relish escaping uncomfortable social situations and ascribe little value to the option to revisit the 
group and build on the “good times” already had together.  One of the authors of this paper recently joined a 
golf club only to discover that “golfing alone” is far preferable to playing with members of rather distinct 
political and social persuasion. 
8 Gurr 1980, Shanin 1966, Coser 1956). The economic literature has hardly explored the 
income- or wealth-dimension of identity, and even less so non-economic dimensions such as 
race, ethnicity, language, religious affiliation, etc.
6  Research on the interaction of these two 
elements of identity and its economic implications (see Stewart 2001) is particularly scarce.  
The basis for the model is the notion that identity affects people’s ability to 
accumulate and make economic use of their social capital. Since T refers to the degree of 
alienation between an individual and a group, it is a function that depends on the identity 
characteristics of the group (represented by the vector E),
7 as well as the identity 
characteristics of the individual (D), so that T = T(E,D).  We assume that there are two 
dimensions to identity.  The first is an economic component, measured as inherited wealth, 
denoted Dy for the individual and Ey for the group.  The second component is an observable, 
but immutable characteristic that a particular society deems as socially relevant to the 
construction of identity (Dx and Ex).  Ethnicity, 
8 skin color, and maternal language are all 
examples of such characteristics.  While seeing people as different based on their ethnicity or 
skin color is of course a social construction (which evolves over time—see de la Cadena, 
2000), our analysis here applies to a time scale in which people take the rules of social 
identity as given.  For simplicity’s sake, we will refer to this socially constructed, identity 
                                                 
6 A recent study (Akerlof and Kranton 2000) explores the role of identity for economic outcomes, drawing on 
some elemental ideas from sociology and social psychology to create a model in which one’s identity informs, 
and is informed by, one’s actions and the actions of others. In this model, people care not only about economic 
goods in the broadest sense of the term, but also about affirming their identity, which can mean doing things to 
differentiate themselves from the advantaged groups even if these actions are not optimal from the standpoint of 
material welfare. 
 
7 As a composite of many individuals, the group’s identity vector will be defined by a measure of central 
tendency for the group’s current or historical membership. 
 
8 In examining how people choose actions according to behavioural social codes, ethnicity has been an issue of 
focus. This is often modelled by changing the basic assumptions regarding the motivation for action. For 
example, in Kuran (1998) utility is composed not only of personal taste, but also of the desire to gain approval 
of those in one’s ethnic group, which may require actions such as practicing a cultural ritual. 
9 relevant characteristic as “color,” though, as indicated, color is only one of many possible 
characteristics which is ascribed such a role. 
For purposes of analysis, we will assume that we can characterize both wealth and 
color with a continuous numerical range.
9 The interpretation of such a range for wealth is 
straightforward, in that low numbers refer to relatively low wealth levels, and vice versa. 
Similarly, low numbers will be given to color, representing a position along a continuous 
color spectrum.  To simplify later discussion, we will assign low numbers to colors that are 
more strongly correlated with low wealth levels in the initial state. This numerical scale is of 
course arbitrary and implies nothing about the intrinsic value of any person or group 
characteristic. 
  Consider the range of identity to be given by the plane [x, y]∈ [0, A]. A particular 
person’s identity is described by the vector D = [Dx , Dy] and the centre of the location of a 
social group in the same plane is given by E = [Ex , Ey]. Let h(x, y) denote the joint 
distribution of agents in the two-dimensional, wealth - social characteristic space.
10 A 
person’s identity influences her sentiments towards a given group, and the sentiments of the 
group towards her. There are two elements that influence the sentiment, or the degree of 
                                                 
9 While continuity of wealth is immediately intuitive, there may be alternative ways to model social 
characteristics. Continuity here has been assumed for analytical convenience and as a way to generalize the 
notion of diversity in social characteristics. In some cases, such as where the sole critical social characteristic is 
gender, or when the society exhibits sharply delineated religious groups, a special case of discrete social 
categories may be more applicable. In other scenarios however, continuity would be distinctly more appropriate 
than a discrete treatment, for example when skin color as a social characteristic is considered in a society such 
as Brazil (see Telles 2002). 
10 Two simplifications are undertaken here. Firstly, the group in the initial state is solely defined by its central 
point E. One may extend this to determine the initial total group composition, but given the way that initial 
group characteristics play a role in the framework, group composition beyond its central point is unlikely to 
influence our results importantly. Secondly, in this initial condition, the location of the group’s centre is set 
exogenously, and we will consider in Section 3 the implications of different initial population distributions in x-
y-space holding initial group locations constant. A more complex modeling strategy would make initial group 
composition and location dependent on initial population distribution, but the simpler approach here ultimately 
permits isolating the effect of central interest in this paper, namely that of varying socio-economic polarization 
in the initial state on subsequent economic inequality, for a given initial social group constellation.  
10 ‘alienation’ toward a given group. The first is the social distance between the individual and 
the group. The second is the strength of group- and self-identification, i.e. the extent to which 
existing members of the social group and the individual feel strongly about their respective 
identities. We will use these components to define a concept of social alienation.  Someone 
whose characteristics make her very different from the group, who is strongly identified with 
her characteristics, and who faces a group that has a strong sense of its identity, is considered 
to be highly alienated from the group in question.  
Formally, we define the degree of effective social alienation between an individual 
with characteristics D and a group with characteristics E as: 
  T(E,D) = t(φ(E,D) · J(E,D)), (3)   
where φ(E,D) measures social distance, J(E,D) measures the strength of individual and group 
identities, and  t( ) is a monotonic function which normalizes the alienation function to range 
from 0 (not at all alienated) to 1 (most alienated).
11  Social distance between the individual 
and the group is simply defined as the norm of the vector of attributes of the social group’s 
centre, E, and of the individual, D: 
2 2 ) ( ) ( || || ) , ( y y x x D E D E D E D E − + − ≡ − = φ   (4)           
Following Esteban and Ray (1994), we posit that the strength of an individual’s self-
identification depends on how many other people are like her.  If there are only a handful of 
people like the individual, then her “peer group” will not be comprised of the critical mass of 
                                                 
11 Specifically, t( ) increases linearly in its argument, and reaches the level of 1 at the highest alienation level 
toward the high group in the case of a bipolar distribution (see the appendix for formal expression of t( ), and 
Section 3 for a detailed treatment of unimodal and bimodal distributions). For all higher levels of the “raw” 
alienation φ(E,D)·J(E,D), t( ) remains equal to 1. The rationale behind employing such a “kinked” normalization 
function for T(E,D) – as opposed to the linear alternative in which the highest overall alienation is set to 1 – is 
to consider scenarios in which for those who are very alienated toward the high group, T(E
hi, D) is indeed close 
to 1, which results in identity constituting a formidable barrier to effectively deriving intrinsic and material 
benefits from this high group. 
11 people necessary to develop a strong identity. Intuitively, strong identification requires the 
existence of group-related institutions that give members a forum in which to interact with 
each other and build a strong sense of group identity. With economies of scale in group 
institutions, a significant presence of a particular category of the population must exist for 
identity-forming institutions relating to this category to emerge.
12  
Formally, we define the component identification function in (3) as  
J(E,D) =ω J(E) + (1-ω) J(D),    (5) 
where J(E) measures the strength of the group’s identity, J(D) measures the same for the 
individual, and  ω ∈ (0, 1) signifies the weight placed on the group’s identification relative to 
that of the individual.  Setting ω = 0 would say that alienation and uncomfortable social 
relationships result when the individual’s identification with her own socio-economic 
characteristics is very pronounced, and therefore feels that she is not being true to herself 
when socializing with the group.  The converse case (ω = 1) would say that the alienation 
and discomfort are a result of a strongly self-identified group making the individual feel 
uncomfortably different, unwanted and ill-fitting.  In later empirical analysis we will attempt 
to capture both forces by specifying an intermediate value of ω.   
  Finally, the identity functions in (5) are defined as 
dy dx i i y x y x h i J y x ) , , , ( ) , ( ) ( π ∫∫ = , 
for i = E, D, and where π(z, i) is a weight function that places greatest weight on density that 
is close to the group’s central characteristics (or close to the individual’s characteristics) and 
                                                 
12 Theoretical and empirical work has established such a relationship between identity and population mass. For 
example, Bodenhorn (2003) finds that antebellum light-skinned African Americans were more likely to identify 
as “mulatto” (as opposed to identifying as “Blacks”) when there were already a substantial number (in absolute 
and relative terms) of other mulattos in the community. Yinger (1986) shows that individuals are more likely to 
adopt a racial identity the larger and the more racially concentrated it is. 
12 increasingly smaller weight on identities that are further away. We will use the tricube 
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where εi is a constant.  J(D) thus straightforwardly measures the strength of the individual’s 
identity based on how many people are like her.   The group identification function, J(E), 
measures the weighted density of people who form the core of the group, i.e. those within a 
radius εE of the group’s centre. For the analysis here we will take εE as an exogenous given 
that reflects the group’s past history or reputation.  An obvious extension of the model would 
be to dynamically update or otherwise endogenize the group’s central location and core.  It is 
important to stress that ε does not signify the borders of group membership, but rather what 
can be deemed its core around the centre.  
 
The Instrumental Value of Social Capital as Social Collateral 
Social relationships are not only intrinsically valuable, as expressed in (1), but can also be 
economically valuable, especially where imperfect or missing markets prevail and where 
information is costly. The economic value of social ties can take on many forms. For 
example, an individual may obtain information about business or employment opportunities 
from those with whom she shares social relationships.
14 Alternatively, she may be provided a 
loan for entrepreneurial activity, which can be a vital source of financial capital especially in 
                                                 
13 As Cleveland (1979) shows, the general tricube weight function (1-u
3)
3 has the desirable properties that it 
takes on the value of 1 for u=0, equals zero for u=1, is monotonic in u, has smooth contact with zero at u=1. 
Therefore, despite the use of the indicator variable I(||z-D||<ε), the weight function is everywhere 
differentiable.  
14 In their analysis of traders in Madagascar, Fafchamps and Minten (1999, 2002) give many concrete examples 
of the types of business advantage that can be leveraged through social capital. 
13 settings in which formal financial markets are poorly functioning. The individual may also 
obtain the benefit of labor assistance on her farm or in her business from others in the same 
social group. This paper does not specifically focus on any of these forms of benefits. Rather, 
it proposes a general framework in which the determinants of economic gain through the 
accumulation of social capital can be examined. 
We then consider an individual who, in addition to directly enjoying social 
relationships, can also garner material benefits B from the social group to which she belongs 
that help her achieve a higher rate of return on her inherited resources. We assume that 
benefits are received in the first period and that the size of the benefits an individual can 
obtain depends on the resources of the group. Holding other things constant — such as the 
strength of the social ties that an individual has built up with others in a given group — an 
individual is potentially able to extract greater material benefits from a social network with 
on average wealthy members, than from a network consisting of poor people. Letting  ) (E B  
denote the maximum capacity for some given group to provide benefits to an individual, we 
capture this by the constraint  ) (E B B≤ .
15  These benefits, be they information about 
employment or business opportunities, access to local public goods, etc. produce returns on 
initial wealth Dy in the second period, where the rate of return r(B) is increasing in B at a 
diminishing rate.  
If the social group is to sustainably provide such services, beneficiaries need to 
reciprocate in some form. Following one of the above examples, this may mean that that 
someone, having increased her profits using valuable price or demand information from 
                                                 
15 For simplicity, we focus on the case where B is a non-rival good. That is, the size of B received by one 
individual does not depend on the amount of B that other group members receive. A model with B as a rival 








* * ) ( for person j.  
14 others in her social circle, faces the social obligation to in turn instruct other members on 
how to take advantage of new opportunities in her area of business. Whatever the particular 
forms of reciprocation, however, their common element is that reciprocation is costly. To 
capture this, we assume that a group expects an individual to commit some of her time to 
efforts that generate benefits for others in the social group, where this time commitment is 
proportional to the benefits she herself received.  We define this expected level of 
reciprocation as lB
 B time units.  We assume that reciprocation occurs in the second period. 
However, because we take this reciprocal obligation not to be contractually or legally 
enforceable, the group faces a commitment problem in terms of the individual’s willingness 
to reciprocate after the receipt of social benefits.  Using the utility function (1), the net gain 
an individual would experience by reneging on her obligation to reciprocate after receiving B 
units of social benefits would be: 
)] , ) ( ) (( [ )] , ) ( ( [ 2 2 S D B r w B l L u S D B r Lw u y B y + − − + , (6) 
where  1 1 2 ] )) , ( 1 ( 1 [ S L D E T S s − + − = δ , and Ls1 is the time that was devoted to social 
relationships in period 1.  Expression (6) is obviously strictly greater than zero, indicating 
that a person is better off reneging on her social obligations.  
While there are various ways in which this commitment problem might be solved,
16 
here we explore the idea that the fact that social capital investment is sunk and intrinsically 
valuable to the individual gives it a potential collateral value that might solve this 
commitment problem.  In particular, suppose the group adopts a rule that anyone who fails to 
reciprocate is socially shunned and their stock of sunk, achieved social capital is destroyed 
                                                 
16 For example, Coate and Ravallion (1993) explore the penalty of termination of future co-operation in a 
repeated-game model of informal mutual insurance. Ghosh and Ray (1996) show how co-operation can prevail 
in equilibrium in a setting in which players, of which there are different types distinguished by their time 
preferences, are randomly matched in stage games. 
15 (i.e., their second period social capital reverts to depreciated inherited social capital, 
1 ) 1 ( S δ − .  In this case, the utility comparison of a reciprocator versus a reneger becomes:  
     [ )] ) )) , ( 1 ( 1 ( , ) ( ) (( [ )] ) 1 ( , ) ( ( 1 1 1 S L D E T D B r w B l L u S D B r Lw u s y B y − + − + − − − + δ δ  (6′) 
Whether or not this expression is positive of course depends on the size of the penalty 
imposed, i.e., the value of the lost social capital.  A deeply alienated individual will feel little 
regret (indeed, perhaps relief—see note 3) at being shunned by a group that was 
uncomfortable with her and with which she was uncomfortable. If T(E,D) is large, then the 
penalty of social exclusion is necessarily low.  
For a given individual with characteristics D and a group with characteristic vector E, 
expression (6′) implicitly defines an incentive compatible benefit schedule, B
IC(Ls1|E, D) as 
the amount of benefit that just keeps (6′) non-positive.  Benefits extended to the individual in 
excess of the schedule would not be reciprocated, while those less than the schedule would 
be.   If we assume that utility is strongly separable in its arguments and that the marginal 
utility of material goods is linear, the two-period utility function given in (1) becomes: 
a c1 + v(S1) + β ⋅ ( a c2 + v(S2) ) 
where a>0, v'(.)>0, v''(.) < 0.  Using this expression, the incentive compatibility condition 
becomes:  
 a [(L-lB B) w + r(B)Dy] + v((1 – δ + (1-T(E,D)) Ls1 ) S1 ) ≥ 
≥ a [L w + r(B)Dy] + v((1-δ ) S1) (7) 
Under these assumptions, the incentive compatible benefit schedule becomes: 
[] ) ) 1 (( ) (
1
) , | ( 1 2 1 S v S v
awl
E D L B
B
s
IC δ − − = ,     (8) 
where as before S .  1 2 ] )) , ( 1 ( 1 [ S L D E T s − + − = δ
16 The IC schedule (8) reveals how the instrumental value of social capital — the 
economic gain it enables — and its intrinsic value are linked. B
IC is determined by the excess 
direct utility one obtains by not being socially excluded, discounted by the cost of 
reciprocation for each unit of B. It is also apparent that the supply of benefits is not 
exogenous from the individual’s point of view, but that she affects it by her decision on how 
much time to invest in the group.  
We are now in a position to formulate the full choice-theoretic model of social capital 
formation for an individual facing a given social group: 
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It is of course possible that neither the incentive compatibility constraint, nor the 
group’s capacity constraint will bind if, given the individual’s initial wealth, the optimal 
material benefit to her is smaller than what the group can offer her and smaller than the 
largest benefit size she would be willing not to renege on.  
In this framework, friendship serves in a sense as social collateral for the benefit 
made available to the group member.
17 The notion of social collateral has commonalities 
with more familiar forms of physical/economic collateral, but it is also distinct in some ways. 
                                                 
17 In the context of credit, Besley and Coate (1995) analyze social collateral by modeling social sanctions as a 
cost that other group members can impose on a defaulter, but the ability of the group to sanction is taken as 
exogenous in their game-theoretic framework. 
17 Just like traditional collateral for a loan (such as land or physical assets), it can be taken away 
in the event of default, and the borrower is thus made worse off. Also, a social collateral 
requirement can be insufficiently large, in which case the individual may be denied the 
economic benefits of being part of a group.  
However, a significant difference between social and economic collateral is the 
former’s specificity: The particular social network is valuable to an individual in the network, 
but it is not a good that can be easily transferred to someone outside of the group and that can 
be found immediately valuable by the outsider.
18 A second difference is that social collateral 
is not of direct value to the group and does not, unlike economic collateral, provide economic 
redress to it in the event of member defection. Indeed, if the group is sufficiently small, it 
might actually bear a cost from excluding one of its members, in the sense of suffering a 
thinned out social network.
19 Hence the only value of social collateral to the group is its 
ability to create appropriate incentives for the individual member by imposing costs of 
deviation on her.  
A number of comparative-static results on the individual’s equilibrium choice of time 
allocation between work and fostering social ties can be derived from this model. Insights 
from these include the finding that, in considering how social investment varies with the 
group’s resources, the limitation on group benefits imposed by imperfect enforcement 
inherent in the social collateral mechanism interacts with the limitation imposed by the 
group’s resource constraint to effect nonlinearities in equilibrium social investment. For very 
poorly and very highly endowed groups, a marginal relaxation of the resource constraint does 
                                                 
18 This conception of social capital as idiosyncratic (or network-specific) collateral finds its analogue in firm-
specific human capital (Hashimoto 1981, Laing 1994) in which training or education is of value to the specific 
firm that provided for this training, but of little to no value to other firms. 
19 This paper does not incorporate in the model the group size, nor the impact of individuals’ social investment 
decisions on the group. This is an interesting area for future research. 
18 not change equilibrium social investment in such groups. Social investment increases in the 
group’s resources only for moderately-endowed groups. Also, the scope of group 
membership for each of two groups (a poor and a rich one) can be derived. For a given 
population distribution, by establishing the threshold degree of alienation T that will result in 
an individual optimally choosing zero social investment, one can draw the boundaries of 
group memberships for the two groups. Not surprisingly, group membership with the more 
poorly endowed group is equal to or smaller than that with the wealthier group, and for 
sufficiently large differentiation between the two groups’ resources, the former is 
significantly smaller. For more details, see Mogues (in progress). 
3.  Socio-economic polarization 
The prior section has modeled how identity-sensitive individuals invest in social capital and 
form social relationships in a world in which relationships are costly to develop and have 
both intrinsic and instrumental economic value.  At the heart of the model is a concept of 
alienation that makes individuals sensitive to the social distance between themselves and 
others and to the overall distribution of individuals in socio-economic space (that is, it 
matters if there are many other similar people to reinforce individual identities).  This vision 
of social capital and identity opens the way to exploration of how the joint distribution of 
individuals across the space of wealth and skin color
20 shapes the creation of social capital 
and ultimately the distribution of income.  As a foundation for that exploration, the goal of 
this section is to develop a way to meaningfully typify that joint distribution and establish 
distinctive benchmark distributions that can be used for the numerical analysis of the model 
in section 4. 
                                                 
20 Recall that our discussion uses skin color as an example of a personal characteristic that society and its 
members see as relevant for an individual’s identity. 
19  
A Measure of Socio-economic Polarization 
This section develops a two-dimensional measure of socio-economic polarization based on 
Esteban and Ray’s (1994) one-dimensional measure of economic polarization. Esteban and 
Ray contrast their measure with conventional income inequality measures. Intuitively, a 
society is highly polarized with respect to some characteristic D when the distribution of D is 
such that the population is grouped into a few, significantly-sized clusters, where people in 
each cluster are very similar to each other in terms of their characteristic D and are very 
different from people in other clusters. As they show, economic polarization may increase 
even as income inequality decreases (the two may of course also move together in some 
circumstances). Underlying their analysis is the contention that it is high polarization (not 
inequality per se) that creates the potential for costly social conflict. From this perspective, 
analysis of the economic costs of inequality (e.g. Alesina and Rodrik, 1994) would be better 
cast as analysis of the economic costs of polarization.  
From the perspective of this paper, two modifications of the Esteban and Ray 
polarization measure are needed. First, the Esteban and Ray measure implicitly adopts a 
materialist or Marxian posture in that it presumes that only economic class shapes identity 
and polarization. And yet as the work of Frances Stewart (2001) and others suggest, the 
potential for destructive social conflict (and self-replicating inequality) is highest when 
economic class is somehow related to other characteristics relevant to identity, such as 
ethnicity or language. Accordingly we extend the Esteban and Ray measure to the case where 
each individual has two characteristics relevant to identity and polarization. The second 
20 modification of the Esteban and Ray measure is simply its adaptation to the case of 
continuous distributions, a change we make purely for purposes of analytical convenience.  
Making these changes, we define two-dimensional socio-economic polarization (P2) 
as:  
1 2 2 1 2 1 1
2
12
) , ( ) ( ) ( ) ( dz dz z z z h z J z h P
zz ∫∫ ∫∫ = φ    (10) 
where as in Section 2 above, z = [x, y] (so that (10) integrates over four variables: social 
characteristics and initial wealth of persons 1 and 2), x is inherited wealth and y is a 
characteristic like skin color or ethnicity that society treats as relevant for social identity; h(.) 
is the population distribution; J(z
j) the identification function for person z
j; and φ(.) the social 
distance function. Analogous to Esteban and Ray’s measure, (10) is the sum of all effective 
alienations in the society.  Mogues (in progress) presents a more formal treatment of the 
socio-economic polarization measure, P2, and its properties. 
  Like the Esteban and Ray polarization measure, the intuition behind P2 is that 
increased socio-economic polarization (which may or may not correspond to changes in 
economic inequality, or to one dimensional economic polarization for that matter) may have 
real economic effects. The model developed in the prior section proposes a specific 
mechanism through which polarization operates. Higher levels of P2 will signal a society in 
which individuals will find it increasingly costly to form social relationships and reap their 
intrinsic and instrumental benefits. Intuitively, we anticipate that a given level of initial 
wealth inequality will become economically more significant as it becomes socially 
embedded, meaning that the social characteristic of ethnicity or language becomes an 
increasingly good predictor of wealth.  
 
21 Benchmark Distributions of Polarized and Non-polarized Societies 
To explore this intuition and study the impact of socially embedded inequality, we need an 
analytical strategy in which we can isolate and hold constant the degree of initial economic 
inequality and one-dimensional economic polarization. As first step, define the marginal 
truncated normal distribution of initial wealth, y, as: 
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The solid curve in Figure 1 graphs this distribution for the parameters that will be used in the 
numerical analysis, µ=5 and σ
2=2. As can be seen, the parameters have been chosen so that 
the marginal distribution is nearly normal (that is, the truncation is trivial).  The Gini 
































Figure 1. Marginal Distribution of Initial Wealth 
22 economic polarization measure of Esteban and Ray is 0.06).  These values will be held 
constant across all the joint distributions considered here. 
As a second step, we define a series of joint distributions of wealth and skin color, x, 
all of which preserve the marginal distribution of initial wealth given by (11). By preserving 
this marginal wealth distribution, inequality and one-dimensional economic polarization are 
also held constant for all the joint distributions. Letting ρ denote the correlation between x 
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where kxy,1 normalizes the distribution so that the area under it in the plane x,y∈[0,2µ] equals 
1, will of course preserve the marginal distribution of initial income, y, given by (11).
21  The 
northwest panel of Figure 2 displays this joint distribution for the base case of  0 = ρ . Note 
that in this case, the social characteristic x is completely uninformative about initial wealth as 
. The P ) ( ) | ( y E x y E = 2 measure of socio-economic polarization is 36 for this case. Within 
the bivariate normal distribution family, socio-economic polarization can be increased by 
increasing ρ, the correlation between initial wealth and the social characteristic.  Note that as 
this correlation increases, skin color becomes an increasingly informative predictor of initial 
wealth. Figure 2 illustrates the shape of the joint distribution for the cases where ρ equals 0.6 
and 0.9. Socio-economic polarization in turn increases to 42 and 55, respectively, as ρ rises. 
                                                 
21 Note that by defining identical ranges to x and y, (14) assures that both components of identity will receive 
equal weight in the two-dimensional polarization measure defined by (12). 
23 ρ = 0, P2 = 36 ρ = .6, P2= 42
ρ = .9, P2= 55 Bi-modal, P2= 54
 
Figure 2. Joint Distributions of Wealth and Social Characteristic 
While these three bivariate normal distributions capture a type of increasing socio-
economic polarization that is independent of one-dimensional economic and social 
characteristic polarization,
22 they do not seem to fully capture the sort of multi-modal 
polarization that is characteristic of societies like Brazil, South Africa and the United States. 
For exploratory purposes, we define a bi-modal distribution that preserves the marginal 
distribution of initial wealth through the following procedure. First the normal marginal 
distribution h(y) is partitioned into two parts: g(y) and f(y) ≡ h(y)-g(y), where g(y) < h(y)∀ 
x,y∈ [0,2µ] and E(g(y)) > E(f(y)). This partition is done numerically using a gamma function 
                                                 
22 Note that the marginal distributions of both initial wealth and skin color are undisturbed by changes in ρ.  
24 for g(y). The dashed, dotted and solid curves in Figure 1 show f(y), g(y) and h(y), 
respectively. These two functions are expanded into two dimensions by multiplying them 
with a marginal normal distribution over x, h
i(x), with means such that E(h
hi(x)) > E(h
lo(x)). 
The resulting bivariate distribution, normalized so that it has the properties of a density 
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and is shown in the southeast panel of Figure 2. Socio-economic polarization is 54 for this bi-
modal distribution. We turn now to explore the economic implications of these different 
levels of socio-economic polarization. 
4. Numerical analysis of polarization and economic inequality  
Using the benchmark distributions shown in Figure 2, this section uses numerical methods to 
analyze how socio-economic polarization affects the distribution of earned income. The 
analysis presumes that there are two pre-determined social groups, a group located close to 
the high mode shown in the bi-modal distribution in Figure 2, and a group located close to 
the low mode.  Under the assumptions of the model laid out in section 2, the wealthier “high” 
group has more resources and opportunities to potentially offer its members.  The poorer 
“low” group has fewer economic resources to offer but is less distant from many poor 
households. 
While a fuller treatment of the model might ultimately treat group location as 
endogenous, the analysis here can be taken to represent a world in which group identities and 
reputations change only slowly in response to the decisions of individuals to join or not join a 
particular group.  In this sense, this is a short run analysis, indicative perhaps of the sort of 
25 processes that characterized post-apartheid South Africa in which individuals became legally 
free to affiliate with pre-existing social groups that carried with them deeply entrenched 
social identities based on their past histories. More generally, the analysis here is meant to 
give initial insights into the ways in which social forces can contribute to the creation of 
economic inequality.   
Table 1 presents the basic results of the numerical analysis. The appendix below 
reports the exact parameterization of the model. As a baseline for the analysis, we first 
consider a world of anonymous, equal access perfect markets. In this world, we assume that 
social relations are of only intrinsic value and that all individuals receive the same rate of 
return on their wealth. The utility specification used for the numerical analysis (constant 
marginal utility of income) assures that under these assumptions all individuals will choose 
equal amounts of work and social time.  
As shown in Table 1, the Gini coefficient for income (wage plus interest on inherited 
wealth) is a modest 0.12 for this perfect markets case. While this figure is low compared to 
real world Gini coefficients, it is not surprising given the relatively egalitarian distribution of 
inherited wealth shown in Figure 1 (and the completely egalitarian distribution of labor 
endowments). 















Equal Access  0.15 --  0.12  0.14 
Unimodal       
ρ    0.0  0.15 36  0.18  0.17 
0.3 0.15  37  0.20  0.18 
0.6 0.15  42  0.23  0.19 
0.9 0.15  55  0.27  0.20 
Bimodal  0.15 54  0.27  0.20 
Table 1. Socio-economic Polarization and Income Inequality 
26   As soon as we move away from the equal access world, social relationships take on 
an instrumental economic value. Even assuming the relatively modest socio-economic 
polarization of a joint normal distribution when inherited wealth and ethnicity are 
uncorrelated (ρ=0), the Gini coefficient for earned income (labor plus capital income) 
increases from 0.12 to 0.18.  The Gini coefficient for final wealth (initial wealth plus income) 
rises from 0.14 to 0.17. 
As Table 1 shows, further polarization of the joint distribution of wealth and color 
leads to ever higher Gini coefficients, with the Gini coefficient for the income distribution 
rising to as much as 0.27 for the most polarized distributions.  Note that this level of 
economic inequality is more than two times the inequality level under the equal access, 
perfect markets counterfactual.   
Figure 3 presents further results from the model that help to explain the forces that generate 
this relationship between polarization and inequality. Both panels of the figure display the 
space of initial wealth and skin color. The dotted concentric lines mark the contours for the 
population distributions, with the top panel displaying the contours for the joint normal 
distribution (ρ=0), while the bottom panel displays the contours for the bi-modal distribution. 
The marginal distribution of initial wealth (which would be obtained by integrating out 
ethnicity) is the same for both distributions, as explained earlier. 
Two other pieces of information are displayed in the Figure 3 graphs. First, the thick 
gray contour line represents the boundary between those who join the high group, and those 
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Figure 3. Group Memberships and Rates of Return on Wealth  
  
28 individuals find it optimal to join the high group, while to the west of the boundary, 
individuals optimally join the so-called low group.
23 
The other piece of information contained in Figure 3 are contours for the realized rate 
of return on wealth. As can be seen in the top panel, under a joint normal distribution with 
ρ=0, individuals located just to the northeast of the mode of the population distribution earn a 
rate of 80% (or higher) on their wealth. Individuals located in the densely populated area just 
to the southwest of that mode still earn returns in excess of 70% on their inherited wealth. 
These high rates of return reflect the fact that nearly all individuals in this low polarization 
world choose to join the high group (all but 0.2% of individuals join the high group in this 
world). While this creates fairly even and high rates of return on wealth for all, agents that 
are more distant and alienated from the high group have to sacrifice more work time in order 
to establish their incentive compatibility. The net result is the rather sharp rise in income 
inequality compared to the perfect markets case shown in Table 1.  
The lower panel in Figure 3 displays the sharply different behavior that occurs when 
the socio-economic polarization rises under the assumption of a bi-modal distribution of 
initial wealth and ethnicity. A large portion of the wealth-ethnicity space is now comprised of 
locations where individuals find it optimal to join the low group. Under this distribution, 58% 
of individuals join the high group, while the remaining 42% join the low group. The income 
distribution consequences of these choices are as would be expected. Those that join the 
upper group—which are now predominately wealthy people—continue to earn high rates of 
return on inherited wealth. With higher degrees of effective alienation, individuals near the 
lower mode no longer find it worth joining the upper group, despite its potential advantages. 
                                                 
23 At endowment locations right at the western edge of the graph, individuals would not join either group. Since 
these locations are sparsely populated under both distributional assumptions, we ignore them to avoid cluttering 
the graph. 
29 The net result is that these individuals join the low group, reaping some direct social benefits, 
but only modest economic benefits. Compared to the less polarized situations with the same 
initial wealth inequality, the society itself has become increasingly unequal through the 
operation of these individually optimal choices. The Gini coefficient for income is nearly two 
and a half times higher than it would be in the perfect markets case, and 50% higher than it 
was in the uncorrelated, unimodal case. In addition, ex post socio-economic polarization as 
measured by P2 is 50% higher in the bi-modal case as compared to the unimodal (ρ=0) case. 
Matching the insights of Stewart and Figueroa discussed earlier, we see that social forces 
tend to make economic inequality more durable when it is socially embedded, even 
controlling for the initial levels of economic polarization and inequality.  
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper proposed a model of social capital as a collateralizable asset. It takes account of 
features that, while being referred to as important, are not well developed in the existing 
literature. These include the process of creating and accumulating social capital, and the costs 
associated with this process; an explicit framework showing what may be particular to the 
mechanism by which economic goods can be accessed through social relationships, namely 
the intrinsic value of this form of capital; and the role of identity in individuals’ ability to 
realize economic value from social relationships. 
This paper then analyzed the implications of socio-economic polarization for 
economic inequality in a setting where getting ahead economically depends on one’s ability 
to accumulate and collateralize social capital. Holding constant initial levels of economic 
inequality, greater subsequent economic inequality results when increased polarization 
30 erodes the ability of those in low-wealth categories to successfully invest in the well-
endowed group. Their alienation from the highly endowed group increases as society 
becomes more polarized, which disproportionately curbs the efficiency with which they can 
accumulate social capital with this group.  
The stylized model of this paper does not do justice to the full complexity of the 
social factors that perpetuate inequality in actual economies.
24  However, it does provide a 
theoretical perspective to potentially important forces underlying the reproduction of 
inequality that have so far hardly been explored by economists. It speaks especially to 
developing economies in which economic status and social categories like race, skin color or 
ethnicity are strongly correlated and which can be described as polarized along these 
dimensions. Empirically, it suggests that analysts interested in the endogenous growth 
implications of inequality need to consider its broader social embeddedness, a point echoed 
by Stewart (2001) and Figueroa (2003).  
Finally, from a policy perspective, it suggests that there may be critical threshold 
levels of socio-economic polarization, beyond which decentralized social and economic 
processes are likely to preserve inequality and perhaps deepen social instability. Social 
capital in such environments is not the “missing link” for development (as the World Bank 
1997 termed it).  Instead social capital—or rather economically effective social capital—is 
simply unattainably missing for some individuals.
25  In such environments, efforts to either 
deepen the reach of markets, or to pursue affirmative action or wealth transfer policies, 
would have particular salience. 
                                                 
24 Expanding the model put forward here to an overlapping generations framework and letting group identity 
endogenously evolve suggest themselves as natural extensions. 
25 Fine (1999) critiques the concept of social capital in terms that are largely consistent with the model put 
forward here. 
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34 Appendix: Parameterization of numerical analysis 
Initial population distribution and central location of groups: 
Wealth-social characteristic space: [x, y]∈ [0, A]; A=10;  
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where α = 53, λ = 8, γ = - 
1/10 , θ = ¼. 
Social capital accumulation:   
δ  = 
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the bipolar distribution. 
Income:  
Wage income: w = 
3/5; L = 1;  Rate of return on wealth: r(B) = M B
η   where M = ½; η = 
7/10. 
Total income underlying actual and “perfect markets” income Gini measure: 
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35 where  dy dx D D B y x h B y x ∫ = ) , ( ) , (
*  and h(x,y) is the unimodal distribution with ρ=0.6.
 
Utility:  β = 
19/20;   a = 
1/10;  v(St) = b St
 ξ  where b = 
2/5; ξ = ¼. 
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